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MikeTheAdamite wrote:I agree BUT Are you sure the IRA are gone?
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014 ... es-britain
SwordBrethren wrote:EendragMaakMag wrote:@Nayto
Yes they didn't win the war, but they did strike a blow so hard that the empire would decline to what it is today. Although, considering that an entire generation was wiped out in the most inhumane way possible, they should have kept fighting until they wiped them out. Then again, if your wife and daughters were raped and then starved to death in tents located in some of the climatically extreme places in SA, your house, your farm, in essence your entire livelihood and all your belongings were burnt to ashes, what would be the point of fighting? It just wasn't worth it. Also, you're absolutely right - I've ALWAYS said that the Boer people's greatest weakness(and whites in general) is that they are too softhearted. But they didn't like the war and repeatedly tried to avoid the war until they had no choice. Which it seems is another weakness - They were always fighting defensively and almost never pursued the enemy beyond their borders. Yes I read that about the jews in the Boer army too. But rather that than being led by jews
@SwordBrethren
You're absolutely right. What I should have said was: With the proper mindset, guerrilla/insurgency tactics can definitely defeat a conventional force. What I was trying to point out is that even though the Boers didn't win the war, their tactics were definitely able to break the brits if they had made better choices. Perhaps a better example would be the SADF during the Border/Angolan war(which was basically our Vietnam and Middle east conflict). Although, keep in mind that in this instance the SADF were the conventional force and SWAPO/Mkontho we siswe(MK)/APLA and the other terrorist factions were the guerrilla force. At first, they tried beating the commies with a conventional approach. They weren't very successful and even the generals of that time admit that. However, once they went back to what we know(in other words, being BETTER guerrillas) with units like 32 Battalion and most importantly Koevoet(both being among the most effective military/para-military units in modern warfare history), they totally annihilated the enemy. All because of a change in mindset aligned with guerrilla tactics. And by mindset I mean they killed everything that resembled an enemy or aided the enemy in any way.
I have read about a dozen books on the wars in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, and Angola, and combining what I took away from those books with what I have read about Vietnam and other insurgencies, I believe a key to putting down any guerilla movement is cooperation from the locals and the use of "pseudo-guerilla" forces to repeatedly ambush genuine guerillas. Pseudo-guerillas function best when they are former guerillas who have switched sides and are fighting for you, but you can also use White men who apply black paint to look black from a distance. The cooperation from the locals comes in a number of forms, mainly denying recruits and supplies to the guerillas. Beyond that, you will need to arm and organize the locals into village defense militias so that they are armed and ready to stop the guerillas from simply taking recruits and/or supplies. The use of pseudo-guerillas will keep the real/genuine guerillas on their toes at all times, they will never be sure if the group of men approaching them, men who appear to be guerillas, are genuine comrades about to embrace them or pseudo-guerillas about to open fire.
The Portuguese never had 500,000 men to detail a platoon sized garrison to every small village in Angola and the USA never had 3,000,000 men to garrison every village in South Vietnam, thus preparing/training/arming the locals to defend their own villages is crucial.
Most guerilla movements gain recruits via force, they threaten to destroy the village unless a certain number of young men are provided for fighting or to at least help carry/haul supplies. A huge percentage of the guerillas in Southwest Africa and Angola did not want to be there, many of them were coerced with threats against themselves, threats against their families, and many had been tricked by the KGB and then dropped into Angola.
East German advisers serving with MPLA in Angola found that they had no stomach for fighting and that they would break ranks and run as soon as they began to receive incoming shells or mortar rounds. One East German officer also remarked that they were savages who were more interested in getting drunk and raping women than in fighting the South Africans and that it was virtually impossible to find guerillas willing to carry heavy equipment such as the belt-fed machine guns, the tripod, the mortar, the mortar baseplate, and that they would drop the equipment and scatter as soon as they began to receive South African indirect/artillery fire. If I recall properly one East German officer wrote that the Angolan blacks were animals unfit to be involved in the spread of communism.
EendragMaakMag wrote:SwordBrethren wrote:EendragMaakMag wrote:@Nayto
Yes they didn't win the war, but they did strike a blow so hard that the empire would decline to what it is today. Although, considering that an entire generation was wiped out in the most inhumane way possible, they should have kept fighting until they wiped them out. Then again, if your wife and daughters were raped and then starved to death in tents located in some of the climatically extreme places in SA, your house, your farm, in essence your entire livelihood and all your belongings were burnt to ashes, what would be the point of fighting? It just wasn't worth it. Also, you're absolutely right - I've ALWAYS said that the Boer people's greatest weakness(and whites in general) is that they are too softhearted. But they didn't like the war and repeatedly tried to avoid the war until they had no choice. Which it seems is another weakness - They were always fighting defensively and almost never pursued the enemy beyond their borders. Yes I read that about the jews in the Boer army too. But rather that than being led by jews
@SwordBrethren
You're absolutely right. What I should have said was: With the proper mindset, guerrilla/insurgency tactics can definitely defeat a conventional force. What I was trying to point out is that even though the Boers didn't win the war, their tactics were definitely able to break the brits if they had made better choices. Perhaps a better example would be the SADF during the Border/Angolan war(which was basically our Vietnam and Middle east conflict). Although, keep in mind that in this instance the SADF were the conventional force and SWAPO/Mkontho we siswe(MK)/APLA and the other terrorist factions were the guerrilla force. At first, they tried beating the commies with a conventional approach. They weren't very successful and even the generals of that time admit that. However, once they went back to what we know(in other words, being BETTER guerrillas) with units like 32 Battalion and most importantly Koevoet(both being among the most effective military/para-military units in modern warfare history), they totally annihilated the enemy. All because of a change in mindset aligned with guerrilla tactics. And by mindset I mean they killed everything that resembled an enemy or aided the enemy in any way.
I have read about a dozen books on the wars in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, and Angola, and combining what I took away from those books with what I have read about Vietnam and other insurgencies, I believe a key to putting down any guerilla movement is cooperation from the locals and the use of "pseudo-guerilla" forces to repeatedly ambush genuine guerillas. Pseudo-guerillas function best when they are former guerillas who have switched sides and are fighting for you, but you can also use White men who apply black paint to look black from a distance. The cooperation from the locals comes in a number of forms, mainly denying recruits and supplies to the guerillas. Beyond that, you will need to arm and organize the locals into village defense militias so that they are armed and ready to stop the guerillas from simply taking recruits and/or supplies. The use of pseudo-guerillas will keep the real/genuine guerillas on their toes at all times, they will never be sure if the group of men approaching them, men who appear to be guerillas, are genuine comrades about to embrace them or pseudo-guerillas about to open fire.
The Portuguese never had 500,000 men to detail a platoon sized garrison to every small village in Angola and the USA never had 3,000,000 men to garrison every village in South Vietnam, thus preparing/training/arming the locals to defend their own villages is crucial.
Most guerilla movements gain recruits via force, they threaten to destroy the village unless a certain number of young men are provided for fighting or to at least help carry/haul supplies. A huge percentage of the guerillas in Southwest Africa and Angola did not want to be there, many of them were coerced with threats against themselves, threats against their families, and many had been tricked by the KGB and then dropped into Angola.
East German advisers serving with MPLA in Angola found that they had no stomach for fighting and that they would break ranks and run as soon as they began to receive incoming shells or mortar rounds. One East German officer also remarked that they were savages who were more interested in getting drunk and raping women than in fighting the South Africans and that it was virtually impossible to find guerillas willing to carry heavy equipment such as the belt-fed machine guns, the tripod, the mortar, the mortar baseplate, and that they would drop the equipment and scatter as soon as they began to receive South African indirect/artillery fire. If I recall properly one East German officer wrote that the Angolan blacks were animals unfit to be involved in the spread of communism.
You are absolutely right. The use of the local population to fight an insurgency is vital for a number of reasons. Besides all the factors you have listed above, it also serves as your intelligence network which in my opinion is the foundation of an insurgency/counter-insurgency operation. That is also why "mak terrs"(tame terrorists) were so useful - they provided a wealth of intelligence and could easily blend back in to the local population to continue their work. Furthermore, using the local population decreases ownfor losses as well. However I wouldn't arm local militias. This could backfire and provide the insurgent force opportunity to arm themselves. Also an easy victory over untrained local militias could also encourage the guerrilla force to be more bold. In this situation I believe brutal punishment is better than prevention for a number of reasons.
I have read of the same sentiment among most advisers in Africa at that time. No wonder the "African liberation movement" was the greatest failure in guerrilla warfare history.
I'm going to disagree with you on the endurance argument in that I believe that prolonging any conflict is a bad idea no matter what the reason. If one leaves even a small insurgent force to become larger, better trained, better armed and most importantly more organized, one risks the insurgency to effectively attack important targets in a well coordinated manner that would make endurance impossible. I believe swift, brutal action is the better option.
See I think we might have different ideas about what a guerrilla ought to be. If anyone thinks I'm talking about the riffraff that was in Africa and now in the mideast...you are mistaken. When I say an insurgency force I'm talking about a "kommando" unit like the Boers had and like Koevoet. Small, highly organized, well trained, well informed, highly mobile units that operate independently to brutally punish the enemy and achieve the objective.
MIkeZealous wrote:As far as the ira are concerned,I served in NI on Op Banner a few times in the 1990,s. They too lacked weapons,numbers.What they used to counter our strengths,was Bombs,Booby traps.snipers and of course bombing/killing innocent men,women children to try to force the govt to remove troops,and negotiate.
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